

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security
THROUGH : Deputy Director (Support)
SUBJECT : Pre-departure Damage Assessment

1. A suggestion re pre-departure damage assessment for resigning or separated employees came to the attention of this office after we had completed the recent Personnel Security Assessment for the DCI. I am not in a position to judge the merits of the suggestion since I am not aware of the degree to which your office is already recording access to classified material of employees who leave the Agency. It is also recognized that full implementation of this suggestion could entail an administrative burden which might render it impractical. Your comments would be appreciated.

2. Suggestion re pre-departure damage assessment for resigning or separated employees:

"a. This suggestion is prompted by the earlier defection to the USSR of [] ex-employee of NSA. NSA embarked on a belated damage assessment, and one cannot help but wonder about its accuracy after a lapse of years. This suggests the desirability for establishing a procedure at the time of resignation or separation to record a general appraisal of classified information to which the employee's position and Agency friends and colleagues gave him access.

"b. It is suggested that this Agency include as part of the processing out procedure special emphasis by the debriefing security officer (of the employee's parent component) on the classified information to which the employee has had access. This interview could also cover specific knowledge of classified activities of each of the offices in which he worked, and names of supervisors. Additionally, the debriefing could include a listing of the employee's close friends in this Agency, where appropriate members of his car pool, and those with whom he associated in Agency sponsored social and welfare activities.

"c. The information obtained during the debriefing (and recorded on a form designed for this purpose) would be the basis for any required investigation in the event a subsequent security question arises after the individual has left Agency employment. Having such information readily available would result in a speedier and more accurate assessment of potential damage to the national security should an ex-employee defect or otherwise become involved in a security case."

J. S. Harman
Inspector General

25X1 O/IG (30 Oct 63)

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 - Addressee

1 - DD/S

✓ 1 - IG Subject (Personnel Sec. File)

1 - IG Chrono

1 - GJZ Chrono

25X1 1 -

01/13 May 1964 by [signature]